Podcast episode
March 29, 2024
Episode 185: Dylan Burns on Proclus the Successor
[We recorded this episode on a very special day in March: we had about four inches of snow the night before, followed by thunder and lightning on the day. That sound you hear from time to time in the background is rain pelting against the SHWEP HQ.
Corrigendum: The ‘Theodore of Methone’ mentioned at around min. 5 is of course Nicholas of Methone.]
We are delighted to welcome Dylan Burns back to the podcast to introduce Proclus the Successor, the greatest of the final flowering of Platonists at Athens in the fifth century. The discussion ranges far and wide, but some of the key points touched-upon are as follows:
- We begin with a basic sketch of Proclus’ life and times from his birth, through his education, and into the nearly fifty years during which he headed the Athenian Academy with almost supernatural energy,
- Professor Burns then gives us a catalogue raisonée of Proclus’ surviving works,
- Followed by a long discussion of Proclus’ extraordinary Elements of Theology, in which the philosopher seeks to prove on grounds of deductive necessity his entire metaphysical system, starting from the proposition ‘Every manifold in some way participates unity’ (Πᾶν πλῆθος μετέχει πῃ τοῦ ἑνός), and building an awe-inspiring edifice of argumentation on that unassuming foundation,
- Including the particularly-Proclean metaphysical divinities known as ‘henads’, which we discuss,
- And then move on to certain similarities – one might say striking similarities – between Proclus’ fusion of the mythological and the metaphysical and that found in Gnostic texts extant in late antiquity,
- Some discussion of the ‘Proclean rule’ that higher principles have greater causal power than lower, such that Being penetrates through the entirety of existence from to to bottom, while a ‘lower’ principle such as nous would not penetrate to the lowest realities; hence a diagram of Proclus’ universe would resemble a diamond-shape tapering to a point at either end,
- The Proclean ontological dynamic of procession – remaining – return,
- And the Proclean ‘slogan’ ‘All things in all, but appropriately to each’.
Interview Bio:
Dylan Burns is Associate Professor of the History of Western Esotericism in Late Antiquity at the University of Amsterdam.
Works Cited in this Episode:
Primary:
Proclus:
- on the ‘flower of the nous’ and ‘flower of the whole soul’: Fragment IV of Proclus’ lost treatise On Chaldæan Philosophy preserved by Psellos, which can be found in Édouard des Places, editor. Oracles Chaldaïques. Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 1971, pp. 209-11 or in Nicola Spanu. Proclus and the Chaldaean Oracles: A Study on Proclean Exegesis, with a Translation and Commentary of Proclus’ Treatise on Chaldaean Philosophy. Routledge, London, 2021, p. 150-51 (Greek) and 153-55 (English); Theol. Plat. I.3, 15.1-17.8 Saffrey-Westerink.
- ‘All in all, but appropriately to each’: El. Theol. 103, p. 92, 13 Dodds.
Olympiodorus on the ‘Proclean rule’: In Alc. 109.18–110.13.
Secondary:
Yuri Arzhanov, editor. Porphyry “On Principles and Matter”: A Syriac Version of a Lost Greek Text with an English Translation, Introduction, and Glossaries. Number 34 in Scientia Graeco-Arabica. De Gruyter, Berlin, 2021.
John Dillon, editor. Iamblichi Chalcidensis in Platonis dialogos commentariorum fragmenta. Prometheus Trust, Westbury, 2nd edition, 2009.
Dodds suggests similarities between Proclus and Gnosticism: this is a reference to E.R. Dodds’ groundbreaking edition/translation of the Elements of Theology, (E.R. Dodds, editor. Proclus. The Elements of Theology. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963. Edited with an introduction and notes by E.R. Dodds), where Dodds points out curiously Gnostic-sounding ideas in Proclus’ text throughout the commentary. See the index s.v. ‘Gnosticism’ for details.
Proclus’ Works and Where to Find Them:
The Proclus-entry at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy by Christoph Helmig and Carlos Steel has a list of Proclus’ extant works and where to find them edited, and a truly-sexy list of all his known works, extant, lost, and spurious.
Recommended Reading:
For the philosophical side of things, the article cited just above is a great starting-point, as is Chlup 2012 (cited below). For a well-rounded topic-by topic coverage of Proclus, one could do no better than the collection Pieter d’Hoine and Marije Martijn, editors. All From One: A Guide to Proclus. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017, from which we cite a few particularly-relevant chapters below.
- Luc Brisson. Proclus’ Theology. In Pieter d’Hoine and Marije Martijn, editors, All From One: A Guide to Proclus, pages 207-22. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017.
- Radek Chlup. Proclus: An Introduction. The University Press, Cambridge, 2012.
- E.R. Dodds, editor. Proclus. The Elements of Theology. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963 [a monumental work, not only in presenting a superb edition of Proclus’ most impactful work, but also a useful English translation, and tons of extra material including important appendices on theurgy and the subtle body still being cited today].
- Marije Martijn and Lloyd P. Gerson. Proclus’ System. In Pieter d’Hoine and Marije Martijn, editors, All From One: A Guide to Proclus, pages 45-72. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017.
- Carlos Steel. Proclus. In Lloyd P. Gerson, editor, The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity, Vol II, pages 630-53. The University Press, Cambridge, 2010.
- Christian Wildberg. Proclus of Athens: A Life. In Pieter d’Hoine and Marije Martijn, editors, All From One: A Guide to Proclus, pages 1-26. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017.
Themes
Chaldæan Oracles, Esoteric Hermeneutics, Gnosticism, Henads, Iamblichus, Interview, John Scotus Eriugena, Late Platonism, Marinus, Orphica, Plotinus, Plutarch of Athens, Polytheism, Proclus, Pseudo-Dionysius, Syrianus, Theurgy, Thomas Aquinas
Stephen Rego
March 30, 2024
Hi Earl.
So here we are at Proclus – ὁ Διάδοχος – at last !! Thanks to you and Dylan for this introduction.
Here are a few of my observations, if I may:
▪︎ Around 32.30 min mark – on the origin of the henads:
E.R. Dodds argued that Proclus takes-on the doctrine from Syrianus (see the commentary on proposition 112 in his edition of the 𝘌𝘭𝘦𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘛𝘩𝘦𝘰𝘭𝘰𝘨𝘺, 1967, pp. 257-260), and John Dillon argued that in fact it can be traced back as far as Iamblichus in its rudimentary form (Dillon, ‘𝘐𝘢𝘮𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘤𝘩𝘶𝘴 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘖𝘳𝘪𝘨𝘪𝘯 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘋𝘰𝘤𝘵𝘳𝘪𝘯𝘦 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘏𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘥𝘴’, 1972, and ‘𝘐𝘢𝘮𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘤𝘩𝘶𝘴 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘏𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘥𝘴 𝘈𝘨𝘢𝘪𝘯’, 1993; for a defence and elaboration of this position, see now D. Clark, ‘𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘎𝘰𝘥𝘴 𝘢𝘴 𝘏𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘥𝘴 𝘪𝘯 𝘐𝘢𝘮𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘤𝘩𝘶𝘴’, 2010, and S. Mesyats, ‘𝘐𝘢𝘮𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘤𝘩𝘶𝘴’ 𝘦𝘹𝘦𝘨𝘦𝘴𝘪𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘗𝘢𝘳𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘴’ 𝘩𝘺𝘱𝘰𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘴𝘦𝘴 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘩𝘪𝘴 𝘥𝘰𝘤𝘵𝘳𝘪𝘯𝘦 𝘰𝘧 𝘥𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘯𝘦 𝘩𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘥𝘴’, 2012).
▪︎ At 34.45 you say the henads have names and atributes. This is not right because the henads are beyond names and naming as they are beyond essence – they are *ineffable*, viz.:
‘Not every class of the gods.. is nameable. For Parmenides too had reminded us that He who is beyond the things as a whole is ineffable. Indeed, there are neither names of him, he says, nor any speech (𝘗𝘢𝘳𝘮. 142A). Of the intelligible gods the foremost genera, which are both united to the One itself and are called hidden, have a high degree of unknowability and ineffability. For what is fully apparent and effable is not immediately attached to what is perfectly ineffable, but it was necessary that the procession of the Intelligibles terminate at this order. So the first thing that is effable and called by proper names exists at that level. For it is there that the intellective nature of the intelligible entities shone forth in the primal Forms. All the beings which before that nature are secret and hidden are knowable only to intellect. This is why all mystical art ascends as far as this order by theurgic activity.’
~ ‘Commentary on Plato’s 𝘊𝘳𝘢𝘵𝘺𝘭𝘶𝘴’ [𝘐𝘯 𝘊𝘳𝘢𝘵.] §71, 32.19ff. Pasquali, trans. Duvick, 2014, pp.65-6, slightly modified,
and a little further on, Proclus explains that
‘the supercelestial region to which even Ouranos extends his own intellective life, 𝘀𝗼𝗺𝗲 𝗰𝗵𝗮𝗿𝗮𝗰𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗶𝘇𝗲 𝘄𝗶𝘁𝗵 𝗶𝗻𝗲𝗳𝗳𝗮𝗯𝗹𝗲 𝘀𝘆𝗺𝗯𝗼𝗹𝘀, though they have in fact named it, have nonetheless left it unknown, since they were able to speak neither of its form nor of its figure and shape. And proceeding even higher than this [region], they have been able to reveal the limit of the intelligible gods only by name and indicate the beings beyond, since they are ineffable and incomprehensible, by analogy alone. 𝗧𝗵𝗶𝘀 𝗶𝘀 𝗯𝗲𝗰𝗮𝘂𝘀𝗲 𝗲𝘃𝗲𝗻 𝗮𝘁 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗶𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗹𝗹𝗶𝗴𝗶𝗯𝗹𝗲 𝗹𝗲𝘃𝗲𝗹 𝗶𝘁𝘀𝗲𝗹𝗳 𝗼𝗳 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗴𝗼𝗱𝘀 𝗼𝗻𝗹𝘆 𝘁𝗵𝗶𝘀 𝗚𝗼𝗱 [𝗢𝘂𝗿𝗮𝗻𝗼𝘀] 𝘄𝗵𝗼 𝗲𝗻𝗰𝗼𝗺𝗽𝗮𝘀𝘀𝗲𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗽𝗮𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗻𝗮𝗹 𝗼𝗿𝗱𝗲𝗿 𝗶𝘀 𝘀𝗮𝗶𝗱 𝗯𝘆 𝘄𝗶𝘀𝗲 𝗺𝗲𝗻 𝘁𝗼 𝗯𝗲 𝗻𝗮𝗺𝗲𝗮𝗯𝗹𝗲, 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝘁𝗵𝗲𝘂𝗿𝗴𝘆 𝗮𝘀𝗰𝗲𝗻𝗱𝘀 𝗮𝗹𝗹 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝘄𝗮𝘆 𝘁𝗼 𝘁𝗵𝗶𝘀 𝗼𝗿𝗱𝗲𝗿. Because, then, the entities prior to heaven were allotted such an eminence of unitary subsistence that they are both effable and at the same time ineffable, spoken and unspoken, and comprehensible and incomprehensible through their kinship to the One, Socrates properly suspends discussion about them (𝘊𝘳𝘢𝘵. 396C-E). For surely names cannot entirely comprehend the essence of these beings, and in general the discrimination of their essence or power in terms of the effable and the ineffable requires a truly remarkable kind of effort. Indeed, Socrates blames [human] memory, not because he disbelieves the myths which set beyond the heaven certain more exalted causes, and considers them worthy of recalling in no way at all (for he himself in the 𝘗𝘩𝘢𝘦𝘥𝘳𝘶𝘴 (247C) celebrates the supercelestial region), but because the most primitive level of existence may not be called to mind and known through imagination, opinion or discursive thought. 𝗙𝗼𝗿 𝘄𝗲 𝗮𝗿𝗲 𝗻𝗮𝘁𝘂𝗿𝗮𝗹𝗹𝘆 𝗲𝗺𝗽𝗼𝘄𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗱 𝘁𝗼 𝗯𝗲 𝗰𝗼𝗻𝗻𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗲𝗱 𝘄𝗶𝘁𝗵 𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗺 𝗯𝘆 “𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗳𝗹𝗼𝘄𝗲𝗿 𝗼𝗳 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗶𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗹𝗹𝗲𝗰𝘁” 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗯𝘆 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗿𝗲𝗮𝗹𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗼𝗳 𝗼𝘂𝗿 𝗲𝘀𝘀𝗲𝗻𝗰𝗲, 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝘄𝗲 𝗮𝗰𝗵𝗶𝗲𝘃𝗲 𝗽𝗲𝗿𝗰𝗲𝗽𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗼𝗳 𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗶𝗿 𝘂𝗻𝗸𝗻𝗼𝘄𝗮𝗯𝗹𝗲 𝗻𝗮𝘁𝘂𝗿𝗲 𝘁𝗵𝗿𝗼𝘂𝗴𝗵 𝘁𝗵𝗲𝘀𝗲 [𝗳𝗮𝗰𝘂𝗹𝘁𝗶𝗲𝘀]. So, that very aspect of them that transcends both our cognitive and recollective life, says Socrates, is the reason for not naming them by means of a set of names. For they are naturally disposed to be known not through names, but the theologians indicate them from a distance by analogy with the visible entities related to them.’
~ 𝘐𝘯 𝘊𝘳𝘢𝘵. §112, 64.28ff., ibid., pp.65-6, slightly modified, my emphasis.
The henads are unities that can be distinguished (even though they are “all in all”) by the ‘particular characteristic’ or ‘individuality’ (ἰδιότης) unique to each; their distinction is only “knowable” *from the perspective of the lower orders*, viz.:
‘There exists there both indescribable unity [ἕνωσις] and the individuality [ἰδιότης] of each characteristic (for all the henads are in all, and yet each is distinct), we gain knowledge of their unity and their distinctness from things secondary to them and dependent upon them.., even as we take our start from sense-perception in acquiring understanding of the differentiation of incorporeal essences, so it is on the basis of the variation in incorporeal essences that we cognise the unmixed distinctness of the primal, supra-essential henads and the particular characteristics [ἰδίωμα] of each. For each henad has a multiplicity dependent upon it, in one case intelligible [noetic], in another intelligible-and-intellective [noetic-noeric], another intellective [noeric] simply, and within this one having an unparticipated multiplicity, another a participated one, and within this latter one having a supracosmic one and another an intracosmic. And thus far extends the procession of the henads. So then, as we contemplate the extent of the whole incorporeal realm which is spread out beneath them and the measured series of variations down from the hidden level to that of distinctness, we declare our belief that there exists particularity and order even in the henads themselves, along with their unity. For it is on the basis of the differences in the participants that we discern the distinctions within the participated; for things that participated without variation in the same thing could not have exhibited such differences relative to each other.
So much, then, may be said concerning the situation of the primal henads and their communion [κοινωνία] with and distinction from one another, of which we are wont to call the one particularity, the other unity, distinguishing them thus also by name from the sameness and difference manifested at the level of Real Being. For these henads are supra-essential, and, to use technical terms, are ‘flowers’ [ἄνθη] and ‘summits’ [ἄκρότητες].’
~ ‘Commentary on Plato’s 𝘗𝘢𝘳𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘴’ [𝘐𝘯 𝘗𝘢𝘳𝘮.] VI.1048.27ff. Cousin, trans. Dillon & Morrow, pp. 407-8, slightly modified,
and,
‘PROP. 145. ‘𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘥𝘪𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘤𝘩𝘢𝘳𝘢𝘤𝘵𝘦𝘳 𝘰𝘧 𝘢𝘯𝘺 𝘥𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘯𝘦 𝘰𝘳𝘥𝘦𝘳 𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘷𝘦𝘭𝘴 𝘵𝘩𝘳𝘰𝘶𝘨𝘩 𝘢𝘭𝘭 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘥𝘦𝘳𝘪𝘷𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘣𝘦𝘪𝘯𝘨𝘴 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘣𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘰𝘸𝘴 𝘪𝘵𝘴𝘦𝘭𝘧 𝘶𝘱𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘭𝘭 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘪𝘯𝘧𝘦𝘳𝘪𝘰𝘳 𝘬𝘪𝘯𝘥𝘴.
For if the procession of beings extends as far as do the orders of gods [prop. 144], the distinctive character [ἰδιότης] of the divine powers, radiating downwards, is found in every kind, since each thing obtains from its own immediate cause the distinctive character in virtue of which that cause received its being. I mean that if, for example, there is a purifying deity, then purgation is to be found in souls, in animals, in plants, and in minerals; so also if there is a protective deity, and the same if there is one charged with the conversion or the perfection or the vitalizing of things. The mineral participates in the purifying power only as bodies can; the plant in a clearer manner, that is, vitally; the animal possesses this form in an additional mode, that of appetency; a rational soul, rationally; an intellect, intellectively; the gods, supra-essentially and after the mode of unity: and the entire series possesses the same power as the result of a single divine cause. The same account applies to the other characters. For all things are dependent upon the gods, some being irradiated by one god, some by another, and the series extend downwards to the last orders of being. Some are linked with the gods immediately, others through a varying number of intermediate terms [prop. 128]; but ‘all things are full of gods’, and from the gods each derives its natural attribute.’
~ 𝘌𝘭𝘦𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘛𝘩𝘦𝘰𝘭𝘰𝘨𝘺, prop. 145, trans. Dodds, 1971, p.129, slightly modified.
▪︎ Around the 37.30 min mark – on the discussion on Orphic theology:
A very useful survey and proposal for the dating and possible make-up of the so-called ‘Sacred Discourses in 24 Rhapsodies’ (Ἱεροὺς λόγους ἐν ῥαψῳδίαις κδʹ) that Damascius tells us were “current” in his day (‘Problems and Solutions Concerning First Principles’ [𝘋𝘦 𝘗𝘳𝘪𝘯𝘤𝘪𝘱𝘪𝘪𝘴] III.159 Westerink) is D. Meisner, ‘𝘖𝘳𝘱𝘩𝘪𝘤 𝘛𝘳𝘢𝘥𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘉𝘪𝘳𝘵𝘩 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘎𝘰𝘥𝘴’, 2018, in which he argues that the 𝘙𝘩𝘢𝘱𝘴𝘰𝘥𝘪𝘦𝘴 were compiled during the Hellenistic period: “The Rhapsodies are a Hellenistic compilation of Orphic material, ranging from the earliest phases of the Archaic Period to the latest trends of the Hellenistic Period” (p.162); L. Brisson, on the other hand, argues for a later date of the 2nd century C.E. (Brisson, ‘𝘏𝘰𝘸 𝘗𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘰𝘴𝘰𝘱𝘩𝘦𝘳𝘴 𝘚𝘢𝘷𝘦𝘥 𝘔𝘺𝘵𝘩𝘴’, 2004, p.100).
Finally, for some good diagrammatic representations of Proclus’ hierarchical system (insofar as the complexity of the Proclean system is representable in a flat ‘2D’ format!), see R. Chlup, ‘𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘤𝘭𝘶𝘴: 𝘈𝘯 𝘐𝘯𝘵𝘳𝘰𝘥𝘶𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯’, 2013, pp. 83-123.
Stephen Rego
March 30, 2024
* also, on the hypernoetic faculties, the ‘flower of intellect’ and the ‘flower of the whole soul’ mentioned by Dylan:
‘[W]hile it is the unique intellective feature of the soul to be possessed of the direct apprehension of the intellective forms and the difference among them [sc. νόησις, noêsis], it is the summit of the intellect and, as they say, its flower [τὸ ἄνθος] and its existence [τὴν ὕπαρξιν] which unites itself to the henads of beings and by means of these to that hidden unity of all the divine henads. For although there are many cognitive powers in us, through this one alone we are naturally able to keep company with the divine and to participate in it. For the “genus of the Gods” [𝘗𝘩𝘢𝘦𝘥𝘳𝘶𝘴 246d7] is to be apprehended neither by sense perception, since it is transcendent over all bodies, nor by opinion and reason, as these are divisible and apprehend multiform things, nor by the activity of “intellection assisted by reason” [𝘛𝘪𝘮𝘢𝘦𝘶𝘴 28a1], as forms of knowledge such as these are concerned with real beings, while the existence of the gods transcends that of beings and is defined as that unity behind the whole of reality.
And so, if indeed the divine is to be known, in some way or other, it remains only [that we] be possessed of the capacity for direct apprehension by means of the existence of the soul and become acquainted with this in so far as it is possible. For we say everywhere that like is known by like: quite clearly, the sensible is known by sensation, the opinable by opinion, the rational by discursive reason and the intelligible by intellect, and therefore the most unified is known by unity and the ineffable principle by an ineffable power. That is why Socrates in the 𝘍𝘪𝘳𝘴𝘵 𝘈𝘭𝘤𝘪𝘣𝘪𝘢𝘥𝘦𝘴 says rightly that, by entering into itself, the soul will behold not only all other things, but also the god. For by converging inwards upon its own unity and the centre of its entire life and casting away multiplicity and the diversity of multifarious powers within it, the soul reaches as far as that highest ”vantage point” [𝘚𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘦𝘴𝘮𝘢𝘯 272e5] of beings. And just as in the holiest of the rites, they say that the initiates first encounter multiform and many-shaped genera projected before the gods, then entering into the tranquil place and having been strengthened by the rites [so as] to receive in purity the divine illumination itself and ‘naked‘, as those men might say, to partake of the divine; in the same way, I think, in the consideration of the whole of reality, when the soul looks at those things which come after it, it sees the shadows and likenesses of beings, but when it turns towards itself it uncovers its own Being and its own innate Forms; and while at first it is as if it observes itself alone, in deepening its self-knowledge, it discovers the Intellect in itself and the orders of beings, and withdrawing into its own interior and, as it were, the innermost sanctuary of the soul, there it contemplates with eyes shut the “genus of the Gods” [𝘗𝘩𝘢𝘦𝘥𝘳𝘶𝘴 246d7] and the henads of beings. For all things are within us in a manner proper to the soul and in this way we are by nature able to known all things, by awakening the power within us and the images of the whole of reality.
And this is the best form of activity: in the quietude of our powers to stretch forth toward the divine itself and to join in the dance around it, and to always gather together all the multiplicity of the soul towards this unification, and letting go of all in so far as it comes after the One, to be established in it and to unite with this ineffable [principle], beyond all beings. For it is proper for the soul to ascend as far as this until, reaching the culmination of this ascent, it ends up at the principle of beings; and having been up there, having contemplated the place up there, and returning thence, proceeding through the beings, making explicit the multiplicity of Forms, detailing both their monads and their sets, and discerning intellectively how each is dependent upon its proper henad, the soul deems itself to have a most complete knowledge of divine matters, having contemplated in a unitary manner both the processions of the Gods in beings and the distinctions of beings with reference to the Gods.’
~ Proclus, ‘Platonic Theology’ [𝘛𝘩𝘦𝘰𝘭. 𝘗𝘭𝘢𝘵.] I.3, 15.1-17.8 Saffrey-Westerink, trans. Fortier, 2014, pp. 140-42, sightly modified.
cf. ‘When the soul establishes itself according to its dianoetic faculty, it possesses a perfect knowledge of beings, while, when (it) has settled in the intellective (part) of its being, it apprehends all things through simple and undivided intellections. But when it has returned to the One and led back to (unity) all multiplicity which is in itself, it acts in a divinely-inspired manner and is connected with the substances (that exist) above Intellect. What is like something else is disposed by nature to be united to it, and any knowledge unites the knowing subject to the object known through likeness, (and it is in this way that) sense-perception (is united) to the sensible object, dianoetic thinking to what is thought dianoetically, intellection to what is thought noetically and, finally, the ‘flower of intellect’ [τὸ ἄνθος τοῦ νοῦ] to what (is) before intellect. As then in other (domains) intellect is not the highest (reality), but the cause which is above intellect, so in souls the intellective (one) is not the first form of activity but that which is more divine than intellect. And every soul and every intellect has a double energy, one unitary and better than the intellective, the other noetic. It is necessary to think of noetic (activity) as intelligible, according to what comes into being and to reality, ceasing (to think of it) based on other lives and powers.
As then after we have become intellective we are united to Intellect, so, (after we have become) one, we run back towards union (with the One) [ὡς γὰρ νοειδεῖς γιγνόμενοι τῷ νῷ πρόσιμεν, οὕτως ἑνοειδεῖς πρὸς τὴν ἕνωσιν ἀνατρέχομεν] (thus) standing on top of our own intellect. The eye too does not see the sun unless it becomes solar [ἡλιοειδής] and (it does) not (do so) through the light (that comes) from fire; from which it is clear that thinking of that (the One) coincides with not thinking of it (at all). ‘𝗕𝘂𝘁 𝗶𝗳’, (the Oracle) says, ‘𝘆𝗼𝘂 𝗶𝗻𝗰𝗹𝗶𝗻𝗲 𝘆𝗼𝘂𝗿 𝗶𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗹𝗹𝗲𝗰𝘁’ – that is, (if you) lean (your intellect) on intellective apprehensions for (achieving) union with the One – in the (same) measure in which ‘𝘆𝗼𝘂 𝘁𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗸 𝗼𝗳 𝘁𝗵𝗮𝘁’ (as of something) intelligible, ‘𝗮𝘀 𝗶𝗳 𝘆𝗼𝘂 𝘁𝗵𝗼𝘂𝗴𝗵𝘁 𝗼𝗳 𝘀𝗼𝗺𝗲𝘁𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗴’, that is, according to a certain proportion of form and knowledge [κατά τι μέτρον εἴδους καὶ γνώσεως ἐπιβλητικῶς], ‘𝘆𝗼𝘂 𝘄𝗶𝗹𝗹 𝗻𝗼𝘁 𝘁𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗸 𝗼𝗳 𝗶𝘁’ (at all) [cf. 𝘊𝘩𝘢𝘭𝘥𝘦𝘢𝘯 𝘖𝘳𝘢𝘤𝘭𝘦𝘴 fr. 1 Des Places – excerpted/paraphrased in bold]. (This is so) because, (though) such intellections (are) simple, (they) are (also) wanting in the unitary simplicity of the intelligible and move towards some of the secondary intellective natures that have already advanced towards multiplicity. Since no knowable thing is known through an inferior (form) of knowledge, what is above Intellect (is) certainly (not known) through intellect, given that this apprehends something and at the same time defines it as the object being thought of, which (as such) comes after (what is) intelligible.
But if we think of this intelligible that has been established on top of the first intelligible triad by virtue of the ‘flower of intellect’ in us, how will it (then be) possible to be united to the One, which is unconnected to anything and imparticipable [ἀσύντακτον πρὸς πάντα καὶ ἀμέθεκτον]? Because, if the primal ‘𝗙𝗮𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗿’ is said to ‘𝘀𝗻𝗮𝘁𝗰𝗵 𝗛𝗶𝗺𝘀𝗲𝗹𝗳 𝗮𝘄𝗮𝘆’ from Intellect and ‘𝗣𝗼𝘄𝗲𝗿’ [cf. fr. 3 Des Places], who is he who has no need to snatch himself away, but absolutely transcends anything and is celebrated as the God of everything [θεὸς πάντων]? But if in another passage [of the 𝘊𝘩𝘢𝘭𝘥𝘦𝘢𝘯 𝘖𝘳𝘢𝘤𝘭𝘦𝘴] the following is said concerning the primal Father: ‘𝗔𝗻𝗱 𝗽𝗿𝗶𝗺𝗮𝗹 𝗣𝗼𝘄𝗲𝗿 𝗼𝗳 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝘀𝗮𝗰𝗿𝗲𝗱 𝗪𝗼𝗿𝗱’ [cf. fr. 175 Des Places], who (is) he who (is) above this and participating in whom the primal Father is said to be sacred [ἱερὸς]? And if he who has appeared as ineffable [ἀρρητότερον] is called ‘Word’ [λόγος], it is necessary that, before the Word, that which makes the Word come into existence be Silence [σιγή], in the same way as the divinizing cause (must be placed) before anything sacred. As then the beings that come after the intelligible ones, which exist (in them) in a unified state, are their ‘words’, so the Word which (is) in the intelligible, having been given substance by the other ineffable henad [ἀρρητοτέρα ἑνάς, sc. Silence], is Word of the Silence that precedes the intelligibles [πρὸ τῶν νοητῶν σιγή], while Silence (is the silence) of the intelligibles.
On no account, then, the flower of intellect (is) the same as (the flower) of the whole soul, but the former is what (is) more unified in the context of our intellective life, while the latter (is) the unity of all psychic powers, which are of many kinds. (This is so) because we are not only intellect but also reason, opinion, attention, choice and before these powers an essence (that is both) one and manifold, divisible and indivisible. Given that the One (in us) has manifested itself as double, on the one hand as flower of the first of our powers, on the other as centre of the whole essence and of powers of all sorts (that revolve) around it, only the One (that is in us can) unite us to the Father of the intelligibles [τῷ πατρὶ τῶν νοητῶν – the first member of the first intelligble triad, sc. the Chaldean Father]. (This is so) because one [sc. the flower of intellect] is intellective and thinks on the basis of the ‘One’ which is in it under the rule of the Paternal Intellect [ἐκεῖνο ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρικοῦ νοῦ – the Demiurge]. But the One [in us] to which all psychic powers of the soul converge [sc. the flower of the whole soul] is the only one to be disposed by nature to lead us to what is above all beings, since it is this ‘One’ that brings unity to all things that (are) in us. Wherefore we are rooted by essence in it and because of the fact of being rooted in it, even if we proceed, we are not uprooted from our cause.’
~ Proclus, ‘On Chaldean Philosophy’ (extract) 4 = Psellus, 𝘌𝘹𝘤𝘦𝘳𝘱𝘵𝘢 𝘦 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘤𝘭𝘰 𝘥𝘦 𝘱𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘰𝘴𝘰𝘱𝘩𝘪𝘢 𝘤𝘩𝘢𝘭𝘥𝘢𝘪𝘤𝘢 [𝘊𝘩𝘢𝘭𝘥. 𝘗𝘩𝘪𝘭.] 209.7-211.15 Des Places, trans. Spanu, 2021, pp.153-5, slightly modified.
Stephen Rego
March 31, 2024
&cf. ‘[W]e do possess, inasmuch as we rank as souls, images of the primal causes, and we participate in both the whole Soul and the plane of Intellect and the divine Henad; and we must stir up the powers of those entities within us for the comprehension of the present subject matter [sc. the ‘One’ of the first hypothesis of the second part of the 𝘗𝘢𝘳𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘴]. Or how else are we to become nearer to the One, if we do not rouse up the One of the soul [τὸ ἓν τῆς ψυχῆς], which is in us as a kind of image of the One, by virtue of which the most accurate of authorities declare that divine possession most especially comes about? And how are we to make this One and flower of the soul [τὸ ἄνθος τῆς ψυχῆς] shine forth unless we first of all activate our intellect? For the activity of the intellect leads the soul towards a state and activity of calm. And how are we to achieve perfect intellectual activity if we do not travel there by means of logical conceptions, using composite intellections prior to more simple ones? So then, we need demonstrative power in our preliminary assumptions, whereas we need intellectual activity in our investigations of being (for the orders of being are denied of the One), and we need inspired impulse in our consciousness of that which transcends all beings, in order that we may not slip unawares from our negations [ἀποφάςεων] into Not-Being [εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν] and its invisibility by reason of our indefinite imagination, but rousing up the One within us [τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν ἓν ἀνεγείραντες] and, through this, warming [ἀναθάλψαντες] the soul (cf. 𝘗𝘩𝘢𝘦𝘥𝘳. 251b) we may connect ourselves to the One itself [συνάψωμεν πρὸς αῦτὸ τὸ ἓν] and, as it were find mooring, taking our stand above everything intelligible within ourselves and dispensing [ἀφελόντες] with every other one of our activities, in order that we may consort with it alone and perform a dance around it [cf. Plotinus, 𝘌𝘯𝘯. 6.9.8.44], leaving behind [ἀπολιπόντες] all the intellections of the soul [τῆς ψυχῆς νοῆσεις] which are directed to secondary things.’
~ ‘Commentary on Plato’s 𝘗𝘢𝘳𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘴’ [𝘐𝘯 𝘗𝘢𝘳𝘮.] 1071-1072 Cousin, trans. Morrow & Dillon, 1992, pp.424-5.
Stephen Rego
April 7, 2024
Correction:
In the extract of Proclus by Psellus above, which differentiates the ‘flower of intellect’ (τὸ ἄνθος τοῦ νοῦ) from the ‘flower of the whole soul’ (ἄνθος πάσης τῆς ψυχῆς), the flower of intellect is described as being “under the rule of the Paternal Intellect” (ἐκεῖνο ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρικοῦ νοῦ), and this is equated with the *third intelligible triad* ( = intelligible Intellect) by Proclus and not the Demiurge as previously stated.
Earl Fontainelle
April 3, 2024
Stephen,
Many thanks for the wealth of Proclean citations. You are quite right that I spoke too blithely about the henads; they are, in themselves, well beyond any attributes we might attribute to them (although, in the usual paradox regarding realities which can only be dealt with apophatically, Proclus tells us lots of things about them!). What I was trying to get at is the fact that, lower down the chains, the henads ‘resolve’ into the gods of the Hellenic pantheon, at which level they not only have names, but proper names, like Athenē, Rhea, Hermes, and Hekatē.
More on these matters in episode 186. We shall also try to do justice to the high-level modes of cognition Proclus alludes to, and see what we can get away with saying about these highly-altered states of consciousness.
Stephen Rego
April 4, 2024
Looking forward to it, Doctor, and I agree with that revised position!
William A Welton
April 20, 2024
Thanks Earl, and Dylan and Stephen. I am really digging all the Proclus!