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Speaking the Silence: On Reading Apophatic Language
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[Correction: We cite, around minute 16, an author called ‘Morley’; this should of course be Raoul Mortley, cited below]
One of the many reasons to love apophatic language is that it defies every attempt to reduce it to something kataphatic. Every time we say what apophasis is about, we are betraying the text, and even if we say it isn’t about anything, we aren’t quite right, because this, too, is a kataphatic statement.
In this episode we attempt to point out some of the pitfalls of reading apophatic metaphysicians and theologians – the ever-present, indeed unavoidable, danger of reductionism in particular – and, in doing so, we indulge freely in some of the same kind of mind-bending logical swerves and recursive deconstructions which the late-antique ‘apophats’ were themselves committed to, thereby making our discussion itself somewhat apophatic. There’s no other way to do it.
Works Cited in this Episode:
NB: a number of the references in the following bibliography are purely fictional.
Primary:
- Alcinoüs on affirmative and negative attributions: Didask. 10 – see Alcinoüs: The Handbook of Platonism. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993. Translated with an introduction by John Dillon.
- Numenius: The Good ‘graciously seated upon being’: Fr. 2 Petty/11 Leemans.
- Philo of Alexandria: ascent vision: De op. mun. 23.70-1:
‘And, winged once again, [the nous is] raised up and, having surveyed the airy region and its vicissitudes, it is borne higher to the æther and the celestial orbits, and joins in the circling dances of the planets and the fixed stars according to the perfect laws of music (κατὰ τοὺς μουσικῆς τελείας νόμους) . Following the love of wisdom which leads it, having overtopped the entire sensory reality (πᾶσαν τὴν αἰσθητὴν οὐσίαν ὑπερκύψας), there it longs for the noetic [reality]. And having contemplated in that place the paradigms and ideas of the sensory things it saw here surpassing beauties it is possessed by a sober drunkenness and divinely inspired like the mystic celebrants, and is filled with another desire and a better longing. Led by this toward the high summit of the noetic realm, it seems to approach the great King himself. And while it longs to see, pure and unmixed rays of thronging light pour forth like a swollen stream, so that the eye of the discursive mind (τὸ τῆς διανοίας ὄμμα) is dizzied by their radiance’ (trans. Nicholas Banner. Philosophic Silence and the ’One’ in Plotinus. The University Press, Cambridge, 2018, p. 174).
- Plato on the Form of the Good beyond being (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας): R. 509b.
- Proclus: In Parm. VII.1172.35 Cousin.
- Pseudo-Proclus: The Letter to Socrates can be found in the non-existent Procli diodochi philosophica minora, operis de virtutibus fragmenta, epistolæ (Leipzig: Steubner 1867), pp. 362-65.
- Pseudo-Stobæus Ἀναγνωσθέντα ἐκ τῶν ἐλληνικῶν φιλοσόφων: Neither this author nor this work ever existed.
Secondary:
- A. H. Armstrong. Negative Theology. Downside Review, 95:176–189, 1973, p. 84.
- Jorge Luís Borges: Sadly, Borges’ Labyrinths of the Neoplatonists (original title El labyrintho de la oscuridád. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Aleph, 1968) does not exist outside of the Library of Unwritten Books.
- Jacques Derrida. How to Avoid Speaking: Denials. In H. Coward and T. Foshay, editors, Derrida and Negative Theology, pages 73–142. State University of New York Press, Albany, NY, 1992. Translated by Ken Frieden. We cite pp. 76-7.
- R. Mortley. The Fundamentals of the Via Negativa. American Journal of Philology, 103 (4):429–439, Winter 1982., p. 431.
- Michael Sells. Mystical Languages of Unsaying. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1994., p. 8.
- Steve. Apophatic Language and the Metaphysics of Mysticism: Rupert of Panopolis and Athenian Neoplatonism (Leiden: Shrill 1997). [A penetrating and well-contextualised study of the uses and limits of apophatic language in the fragments of Rupert, interpreted using material from Proclus and Damascius, this study sets the terms for debate over Rupertarian metaphysics. It makes a number of errors of interpretation, however, chiefly through an essentialist position toward ‘mysticism’ and through not being a real book in the first place].
- John Turner on the ‘elative’ direction of apophatic discourse: John D. Turner. Victorinus, Parmenides Commentaries, and the Platonizing Sethian Treatises. In Kevin Corrigan and John D. Turner, editors, Platonisms, Ancient, Modern and Postmodern, pages 55–96. Brill, Leiden, 2007. We cite p. 70, n. 36:
‘The via negativa is implemented by negative predications followed by an adversative elative clause: either triple negation, “it is neither X nor Y nor Z, but it is something superior” or double, antithetical negation, “it is neither X nor non-X, but it is something superior” or just a single negation, “it is not X but it is superior to X.” The “but” clause is always positive and elative, referring to “something else” above, beyond, superior to the previously negated predications. Thus negation of all alternatives on one level of thought launches the mind to upward to a new, more eminent level of insight.’
Albert Hand
July 8, 2020
Haven’t regretted getting the membership.
Johannes Drever
July 9, 2020
Speechless
James Lomas
July 11, 2020
The last statements of the Parmenides:
“Then may we not sum up the argument in a word and say truly: If one is not, then nothing is?
Certainly.
Let thus much be said; and further let us affirm what seems to be the truth, that, whether one is or is not, one and the others in relation to themselves and one another, all of them, in every way, are and are not, and appear to be and appear not to be.
Most true.”
And there it ends.
Earl Fontainelle
September 17, 2020
Boom!
Bernie Lewin
July 16, 2020
I can see how you sometimes resist the tendency to be a player on the inside of this philosophy in your presentation. It is admirable to resist abandoning neutrality and staking an interpretation and so avoid excluding listeners who might stake another. However, there really does seem to be a problem of capture by the modern linguistic analytic method, and this is disappointing to find in someone so steeped in Platonism. In that Plato and Platonism was successful in turning the mind’s eye around to see the forms, it escaped what became the Aristotelian triumph, the triumph of linguistic method. If you abandon Aristotle’s organon as a first philosophy, then you might find that actually there is very little change between Plato’s teaching in the late dialogues and some of the great late writings in platonic mysticism. I mean where the teaching would remain much the same, only the method of exposition might have changed. So let me see if I can show what I mean…
You are finding and pushing at the limits of the linguistic approach to philosophy, but this is not the limit of what can be shown using language. In our modern tradition Wittgenstein can help with his showing (zeigen) as opposed to saying (sagen). I could probably show you how to ride a bike without using a single word – and so without predication. I can show you how to *see* an X-ray using words but only as injunctions: “Do what I am doing and you will see what I am seeing.” Lots can be shown with words. For example, I can give you 10 examples of syllogisms and you might get the knack, and you might even show me by giving me another. Of course, I could have define the syllogism in words (i.e., saying). Kids mostly learn language, especially grammar, not by saying but by showing.
A fallacy pervades modern philosophy and its scepticism (e.g., Derrida) is that the form of knowledge is the form of its communication. This is why folks get trapped with predication or with sign/signified. The forms of mathematics (and so in the Platonic sense the very essences of all being) are not semiotic. Consider the arithmetic two. It is signified by the numeral 2 but *expressed* in two things. Or: two things are two in that they *partake* in twoness. This two in itself is invisible, ineffable, unseen, timeless, immediate to the mind and universal (and so the Platonist would say it is *divine*). Two-in-itself is not in the form of predication but we can show it to each other: “Here are two pebbles, two cups, two marks….do you see what I mean?” That’s showing. That is not predication or signification. You are finding the form of two through its participation in your particular experience. Indeed, all mathematics is grounded in showing. Now consider: can we call anyone a Platonist who does not say that mathematics is the organon, the first philosophy?
So what is being shown in Platonic math? Following the allegorical section of the Republic there comes the education program of the philosopher. Science is founded in the one. No ordinary one. This one always brings to mind also its opposite, not-one or none. Draw a circle on a sphere. Shade the inside and call it one. Call the outside none. Now remove the shading and shade the outside. These are platonic opposites. If One is the same then its other is none. If none is the same then its other is the one. Every thing, every idea, has its opposite implicit in it. In this sense: One is one and none. Notice the linguistic contradiction. But notices that the *image* given through my words shows no contraction. I find this same/other form explained very well at the end of the Sophist, right after the “son” of Parmenides announces that he is about to “kill his father”. Plato is saying and showing that Parmenides was almost right – he pointed the way, as does, more cryptically, the eponymous dialogue.
This brings me to how you find it curious where an ancient writer teaches the ineffability as a secret. If ineffable then why the secrecy? Surely this is just like the prohibition on idols. The danger is to mistake the word or image for the source. Eastern teaching talks of not mistaking the finger for what it is pointing at. And yet I would be careful not to berate someone (Steve) for calling the sources an experience, or for anyone calling it anything at all. Because it’s all in the showing. If I point to two pebbles on the counting board and say ‘that’s two’, you know what I mean. If I bring the form of Republic’s one/none to the same/other form in Sophist, and this to my circles on the sphere and say “This is the same/other form of the one”, well, you would know what I mean. It’s not any of them! Perhaps what you need is a disclaim right at the beginning like Lao Tzu: “The name that can be named is not the eternal name.”
And so perhaps with your straw man Steve: Of course *it* can’t be an experience when there is no one having the experience! Steve might know that and might respond:
Hey man, I was just trying to point the way. Do you know what I mean?
Earl Fontainelle
July 16, 2020
Thanks for the penetrating comments, Bernie. In full agreement; we could even point to the use of σημαίνομαι in Plotinus and later for just such an understanding of ‘showing’ versus ‘telling’. One way of listening to this episode is to hear it as precisely an anatomy of the Aristotelean approach you mention, showing how it falls short of being able to do justice to the material in various ways. I think, though, that we also need to be aware of related limitations inherent in our humanistic scholarly approaches (which, remember, are the benchmark to which the SHWEP is committed, and which are maybe ‘Aristotelean’ in this sense), while pushing against them. So we are doing that, too.
But obviously we are not giving up the struggle, from within, against the intellectual constraints of academic discourse, or this episode would be silence.
Thanks again.
Earl Fontainelle
July 17, 2020
Bernie,
This is an interesting point which I missed the first time around. ‘Surely this is just like the prohibition on idols. The danger is to mistake the word or image for the source.’ I’m going to think about that reading; I’m not convinced you are right, but it certainly bears thinking on.
Bernie Lewin
July 17, 2020
Francis Bacon
Thomas Kiefer
July 16, 2020
Wonderful show, and wonderful comments!
I might have missed this, but if “the First” and its analogues are utterly (pun intended) ineffable, *and* it is non-experiential, how did these thinkers like Rupert “know” “it was there”? Inference, through either logic, or its effects?
Is there any Pseudo-Rupertian literature out there? ( :
Thank you for your podcast!
Earl Fontainelle
July 17, 2020
Thomas,
This is generalising, but they typically ‘knew’ the One or First or whatever ‘was’ ‘there’ through some hyper-epistemic act: often a seeing-which-is-not-a-seeing, or some special term reserved for this kind of hyper-knowing, like gnoŝis in some Hermetica, theôria and similar in Plotinus (with occasional use of weird Epicurean terms that you never find in Platonism), non-knowing, all kinds of stuff. If there’s a pattern, it would seem to me, it is the deliberate repurposing of terms from the normal language of epistemology, usually coupled with a denial of some kind, or at least hedged with specific definitions which make it clear that this ‘knowing’ (or sensing — Plotinus is fond of vision and touch in this context) is no ordinary knowing.
Another thing about these modes of ‘unknowing’ is that they are utterly direct — in fact, in many cases the difference between object of knowledge, act of knowing, and knower will have already collapsed BEFORE the unknowing is attained; it is thus an act of utter intimacy-beyond-intimacy with the ‘object’ of the ‘perception’, if you see what I mean.
As for the Pseudo-Rupertarian literature, I am of the minority school, following the theory propounded by the obscure Russian scholar Mikhael Ibrahimovich Strashny (who deserves to be much better known!) that the whole of The Serpent might either be Pseudo-Rupertarian or have major additions from a later hand. The text seems sort of aphoristic, but then there are these explanatory passages which look like glosses that have crept into the text. The whole question of whether the Pseudo-Rupert is a Christian is another vexed one, and probably insoluble, for my money. Lewinsky’s theory that Rupert himself is a Christian is surely fantasy, though.
Kenneth Selens
September 13, 2020
I am not very happy that Steve cannot have an orgasm. Hey Steve, don’t worry man, it’s nothing. I’ve had an orgasm, or did I, because I didn’t even get to experience it… you’re not really missing anything because it’s, no thing 😉
Earl Fontainelle
September 13, 2020
Perhaps Steve can, but just hasn’t got around to it yet. Maybe he’s only five years old. There’s a lot we don’t know about Steve.
Kenneth Selens
September 13, 2020
Well, Steve is a very precocious child studying such advanced historical primary texts…
Kenneth Selens
September 13, 2020
In all seriousness, good work allowing the texts to speak for themselves.
Kenneth Selens
September 17, 2020
Wanted to do just a bit of research before I continued, to see if I had some ground to stand on. Wanted to see if you, Earl, have similar understandings? As you might’ve noticed my mostly tongue-in-cheek sarcasm did carry some longing for more. As I see it, classical metaphysics holds to a just short of complete openness to transcendence, therefore they did not lack experience of the ineffable. Rather, it was supra experiential, transcending hand to mouth experience of the average and every day. So from the perspective of today’s conservative Christian metaphysics, imminence is the real secret, and complete utter transcendence and the inability to experience it is the average every day experience from that perspective.
Kenneth Selens
September 17, 2020
I know those last couple of lines were incoherent, running-on, and redundant in composition.
What I was trying to say… Immanence towards the divine was immensely more present to ancient and their classical metaphysics. Christianity eventually mutated classical transcendence into total inaccessibility. This mutation is a example of bona fide non-experience, whereas the middle and late Platonists had supra-experiential, ineffable encounter.
Earl Fontainelle
September 17, 2020
I think you are generalising too much about the Christians. Some of those cats seem to have ‘been there’, not that I’m any qualified judge. We’ll be exploring some pretty heavy Christians as the ‘cast progresses.
Kenneth Selens
September 17, 2020
I suppose I was really talking about contemporary conservative Christianity. I do realize that it is quite different from much patristic theology. Divine immanence seems virtually nonexistent which likely started with Augustines total depravity.
Earl Fontainelle
September 17, 2020
I tend to agree, off the record. Exoteric religion without the esoteric to balance it becomes poison. Maybe it was near-total depravity, though; Augustine did read a lot of Porphyry and Apuleius and Hermes, and I think a little of it rubbed off on him despite his earnest wish to go full-bore exoteric.
Philip brown
February 21, 2023
God is funny. (Sorry, not funny!) More seriously, can a hardcore apophatist be distinguished from an atheist? If no, what is religion? If yes, what is an atheist? I enjoy the SHWEP, even if it cannot be one inch tall.
Earl Fontainelle
February 21, 2023
Philip,
The atheist question is actually a really good one. If you look at the essay Dénegations by Jacques Derrida he gets into apophatic via negativa material from an atheist perspective, and you get a really good picture of how slippery the discursive terrain can become.
Maybe a religious apophat points upwards, while an atheist just shrugs?